The 23rd summer course: Behavior Modeling in Transportation Networks September 11-13, 2024

#### Bayesian Truth Serum and Stated Preference Survey

Yusuke Hara (Tohoku University)




This is a joint work with Tomoki Nishi in TOYOTA CRDL, INC.,

## Background

- Demand forecasting for unknown goods and services
  - If autonomous driving becomes a reality, will you buy an autonomous vehicle?
  - If you buy an autonomous vehicle, will you live in the city center or in the suburbs?
  - Do you want to use an autonomous mobile gym that comes to your home?





# Stated Preference (SP) Survey

- Preference data that observe preference in a hypothetical situation is called **Stated Preference (SP)**.
  - Specifically, discrete choice data is referred to as stated choice (SC).
- SP surveys enable us to forecast the demand for new transportation services that do not currently exist.
- Differences from questionnaire surveys
  - Controls for the effects of trade-offs between attributes of alternatives based on experimental design.
  - responses are used to estimate behavioral models.


#### **Example of Stated Preference Survey**

• Which transport mode will you use?

	Subway	Bus	LRT
Total travel time	25 min	40 min	30 min
Fee	220 JPY	200 JPY	250 JPY
Access time	8 min	2 min	5 min
Egress time	5 min	1 min	4 min
Frequency	10 per hour	6 per hour	5 per hour
Choice			

#### **Example of Stated Preference Survey**

• Which transport mode will you use?



By controlling for the trade-offs between the attributes of each option, SP survey enable us to estimate sensitivity with respect to each attribute.

# Hypothetical bias in SP survey

#### **1. Experimental Scenario Uncertainty**

- Ambiguity and uncertainty about unfamiliar goods and services
- Validity of hypothetical scenarios

#### 2. Heterogeneity of respondents


- Information and knowledge possessed by each respondent
- Preference heterogeneity

#### 3. Dishonest response

- Survey credibility, including policy maneuvering bias and justification bias
- Survey stability, including response fatigue and cold start issues


#### Method to eliminate inaccurate responses

 In contrast to the quality control of crowdsourcing in the field of human computation



Crowdsourcing


Do you want a self-driving car or a normal car?




**Stated Preference** 

#### Spam worker detection in crowdsourcing

- Detect spam workers by calculating the percentage of correct answers.
- Detect spam workers by having them solve the same problem and deciding the answer by majority vote
  - Both are inefficient.
- Latent class model (Dawid and Skene, 1979; Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002) can estimate the workers' ability and ground truth simultaneously.




#### However, there is no ground truth in the case of SP



**Stated Preference** 

Do you want a self-driving car or a normal car?



# The method to induce information and knowledge possessed by respondents

- Can we detect heterogeneity in respondent preferences and dishonest responses?
- Bayesian Truth Serum (Prelec, 2004)
  - A kind of proper scoring rule. (Johnson et al, 1990)
  - In this mechanism, responses are scored such that the highest score is obtained when the true subjective probability is answered.
  - BTS can be used to
    - Improve the accuracy of survey results
    - Identification of superior respondents
    - Behavioral change of respondents (truth-telling)
  - We will apply the BTS to SP survey.

### **Bayesian truth serum**

- The original BTS is the mechanism design to make a survey to answer things that are difficult to answer under normal conditions.
  - e.g., Have you ever shoplifted?, Are you racist?

#### Q1: Any category question

Q2: Questions that make you predict "how others will respond to Q1."

- For example,
  - Q1: Have you ever shoplifted?
  - Q2: How many people do you think would answer Yes to Q1?

Yes/No

%

### **BTS Score**

- Respondent *i*'s response of Q1 is denoted by  $x_{ik}$  and the response of Q2 is denoted by  $y_{ik}$ .
- The BTS score is defined as

$$\overline{x_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ik}$$

Arithmetic mean of actual responses

$$\log \overline{y_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log y_{ik}$$

Geometric mean of predicted responses

$$BTS \ Score_{i} = \sum_{k} x_{ik} \log \frac{\overline{x_{k}}}{\overline{y_{k}}} + \alpha \sum_{k} \overline{x_{k}} \log \frac{y_{ik}}{\overline{x_{k}}}$$

Information score Prediction score

#### **BTS Score**

Q1 Have you ever shoplifted?	Q2 How many people do you think would answer Yes to Q1?	BTS Score		
Yes	20%	+0.31	<b>←</b>	"Good" response
Νο	10%	-0.18		
Yes	5%	+0.09		
No	30%	-0.09		"Door" rooponoo
• • •	• • •	• • •		"Poor" response
No	25%	+0.32	+	

Percentage of Yes 25% Predicted percentage of Yes 18%

#### **BTS Score**

$$BTS \ Score_{i} = \sum_{k} x_{ik} \log \frac{\overline{x_{k}}}{\overline{y_{k}}} + \alpha \sum_{k} \overline{x_{k}} \log \frac{y_{ik}}{\overline{x_{k}}}$$

Information score

Prediction score

- Information score is
  - If the "Actual Percentage" is higher than the "Predicted Average", those who chose the option will receive a high score.
  - This is the rule that the majority gets a higher score compared to everyone else's prediction.
- Prediction score is
  - The closer the prediction is to the actual percentage, the higher the score.

### The characteristics of BTS

- Scoring does not require an external "ground truth"
  - No need for verification that the person is a shoplifter.

#### Scoring independent of response distribution

- Possibility of high scores even for minority opinions
- It is often the case that a small group of people with some expertise, or a group of actual criminals, know more about the real situation than the general public.

#### Incentive compatibility


- Linking BTS scores to incentives can elicit desired behavior (truthtelling)
- To increase the BTS score, it is incentive compatible to answer honest choices and true subjective probabilities.

#### **Research idea: BTS-SP + Latent class**

- Detect dishonest spam respondents using both choice and predictive responses, and continuously separate spam respondents from those useful for model estimation.
- BTS scores accurately identify spam responses and responses due to preference heterogeneity.
- In doing so, we improve the predictive performance of the model and clarify the responses to the important variables.


# The difference from experimental design of SP survey

• Which transport mode will you use?




• What percentage of people do you think would make the same choice you did?

Prediction



Just add this!

### Approach of our analysis



#### **Pseudo BTS score**

• BTS score

$$\overline{x_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_{ik}$$
$$\log \overline{y_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log y_{ik}$$

Arithmetic mean of actual responses

Geometric mean of predicted responses

$$BTS \ Score_{i} = \sum_{k} x_{ik} \log \frac{\overline{x_{k}}}{\overline{y_{k}}} + \alpha \sum_{k} \overline{x_{k}} \log \frac{y_{ik}}{\overline{x_{k}}}$$

Pseudo BTS score

$$\overline{x_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \widehat{P}(x_{ik})$$


Arithmetic mean of actual responses by using a choice model

 $\log \overline{y_k} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \log \widehat{P}(y_{ik})$  Geometric mean of predicted responses by using a prediction model

$$pseudo\_BTS\ Score_{i} = \sum_{k} x_{ik} \log \frac{\overline{x_{k}}}{\overline{y_{k}}} + \alpha \sum_{k} \overline{x_{k}} \log \frac{y_{ik}}{\overline{x_{k}}}$$

# An example of BTS-SP survey


• Demand forecasting for mobile gym



VS online gym, gym


- Attributes of each option
  - Availability of personal trainer
  - Monthly Fee
  - Distance from home
  - Business Hours
  - Availability of swimming pools
  - Availability of parking

### The result of pseudo BTS score



- High IS = Users for whom models are "easy to guess".
- Low IS = Users for whom the model is "hard to guess".
- PS variation is significantly greater than IS variation.
- Low IS does not necessarily mean low PS.
- They are not easily correlated.

#### **Detection of spam respondents**



Membership function of spam respondents

$$P_{i,spam} = \frac{\exp(\beta_1 \cdot x_{i,IS} + \beta_2 \cdot x_{i,PS} + \beta_3)}{1 + \exp(\beta_1 \cdot x_{i,IS} + \beta_2 \cdot x_{i,PS} + \beta_3)}$$

Parameter	estimates		
IS	4.804		
PS	0.0044		
constant	-0.824		

• Spam respondent probability tends to increase with lower PS and decrease with higher PS.

#### Improvement of model performance

Model performance

	MNL	Latent MNL	Pseudo BTS Latent MNL
# of parameters	15	27	31
# of observations	7902 (1317)	7902 (1317)	7902 (1317)
Initial LL	-5477.249	-5477.249	-5477.249
final LL	-4456.009	-4384.219	-3935.282
likelihood ratio	0.184	0.195	0.276

- Number of model parameters is almost the same as the normal latent class model (+4), but model performance is greatly improved.
- The difference is created by the pseudo BTS score, which scores the responses of each subject in the population.
  - Sort "honest respondents" who respond to attributes from "spam respondents" who do not.

# Summary

- Demand forecasting for unknown goods and services remains an important challenge.
- We proposed a new experimental design, the BTS-SP survey, to overcome the problems of classical SP surveys and to detect dishonest responses.
- Two-level latent class model estimation using pseudo BTS score.
  - Significantly improved model performance over naïve latent class models by identifying the preference heterogeneity and detecting spam respondents.

#### References

- 1. Dawid, A. P., & Skene, A. M. (1979). Maximum likelihood estimation of observer error-rates using the EM algorithm. *Journal* of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics), 28(1), 20-28.
- 2. Boxall, P. C., & Adamowicz, W. L. (2002). Understanding heterogeneous preferences in random utility models: a latent class approach. *Environmental and resource economics*, 23(4), 421-446.
- 3. Prelec, D. (2004). A Bayesian truth serum for subjective data. *Science*, *306*(5695), 462-466.
- 4. Johnson, S., Pratt, J. W., & Zeckhauser, R. J. (1990). Efficiency despite mutually payoff-relevant private information: The finite case. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 873-900.
- 5. Menapace, L., & Raffaelli, R. (2020). Unraveling hypothetical bias in discrete choice experiments. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, 176, 416-430.
- 6. Beck, M. J., Fifer, S., & Rose, J. M. (2016). Can you ever be certain? Reducing hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments via respondent reported choice certainty. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological*, 89, 149-167.
- 7. Fifer, S., Rose, J., & Greaves, S. (2014). Hypothetical bias in Stated Choice Experiments: Is it a problem? And if so, how do we deal with it?. *Transportation research part A: policy and practice*, 61, 164-177.
- 8. Haghani, M., Bliemer, M. C., Rose, J. M., Oppewal, H., & Lancsar, E. (2021). Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part I. Macro-scale analysis of literature and integrative synthesis of empirical evidence from applied economics, experimental psychology and neuroimaging. *Journal of choice modelling*, *41*, 100309.
- 9. Haghani, M., Bliemer, M. C., Rose, J. M., Oppewal, H., & Lancsar, E. (2021). Hypothetical bias in stated choice experiments: Part II. Conceptualisation of external validity, sources and explanations of bias and effectiveness of mitigation methods. Journal of choice modelling, 41, 100322.
- 10. Hensher, D. A. (2010). Hypothetical bias, choice experiments and willingness to pay. *Transportation Research Part B: methodological*, 44(6), 735-752.